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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of Case.
The Appellant, Sherman Storage, LLC, ("Sherman"), is an Idaho Limited Liability

Company which owns real estate in Kootenai County. Sprint Spectrum, LP., ("Sprint"),
is a large cellular telephone company.

Global Signal Acquisition II, ("Global"), is the

successor in interest, attorney in fact, and assignee for Sprint.

Global owns and

manages cell tower sites. Sprint and the original landowner, The Wallace Family Trust
("landowner") entered into a cell tower lease in 1996 called the PCS Site Agreement
("Agreement").

The Agreement is a lease of real property for the installation and

maintenance of Sprint's cell tower facility and improvements.

B.

Course of Proceedings.
On May 19, 2009, Sherman filed the Complaint in this matter, seeking an Order

of Ejectment, simply stating that Global's cell tower infrastructure was encroaching on
Sherman's property on former 24th Street, and that Global had refused to move. On
July 30, 2009, Global filed its Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim, and
Third Party Complaint for Indemnification against The Wallace Family Trust. On
December 1, 2009, the Order for Default of The Wallace Family Trust was entered.
After obtaining the Order for Default, Global entered into a Stipulation with The Wallace
Family Trust and received an assignment of the cause of action to quiet title to the
vacated 24th Street. Sherman was allowed to amend its Complaint after purchasing Lot
4 from The Wallace Family Trust. The Amended Complaint alleged causes of action for
ejectment, mesne profits, and breach of the PCS Site Agreement.
Motions for Summary Judgment.
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Both parties filed

The trial court issued its Decision on Summary

Judgment on October 4, 2010, ruling in favor of Sherman that the PCS Site Agreement
was a clear and unambiguous contract, that the lease site was to be located only on Lot
4, that Global's facilities were an encroachment upon abandoned 24 th Street, and the
same was a breach of the Agreement. R. p. 792. The matter was set for trial. Each
party continued in its motion practice. The matter eventually came for a court trial on
June 4, 2012. After trial, the court issued its Decision Re: Court Trial on September 19,
2012. R. p. 1333. The court entered its Judgment on December 18, 2012. R. p. 1432.
Global moved for attorney's fees and costs. R. p. 1348. The trial court granted the
Motion and entered an Order for Attorney's Fees and Costs on December 18, 2012. R.
p. 1439. Sherman filed a Motion to Reconsider, which was partially granted and denied.
R. p. 1483. The court issued its Amended Final Judgment on April 18, 2013.

R. p.

1575. Sherman timely filed its Notice of Appeal. No cross-appeal was filed.
C.

Statement of Facts.
Sprint approached The Wallace Family Trust in 1996 for a proposed cell tower.

Exhibit 49 pp. 49,-50. A representative of Sprint personally negotiated the Agreement
with The Wallace Family Trust and represented that it would arrange and be
responsible for all costs of construction, surveying, engineering, and title insurance.
Exhibit 50 pp. 12-21 and Exhibit 49 pp. 56-57. In negotiating the PCS Site Agreement,
the parties' intent was clear that only Lot 4 would be encumbered, and not the east half
of 24th Street. Exhibit 49 pp. 49-50; 86-87.

Sprint did not want to incur additional

expense, and was only interested in paying for a lease on Lot 4.

Exhibit 49 p. 55.

Sprint itself stated that Lot 4 was sufficient to handle the cell tower lease area. Exhibit
50 pp. 27-28.

The parties' negotiations were consistent with terms of the final
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Agreement.

Exhibit 4 pp. 175-178; Exhibit 49 p. 47; Exhibit 50 pp. 19-21.

The

dimensions of Lot 4 exceed 3,000 square feet, and can therefore accommodate the
requirements of the Agreement. Tr. Vol. I, p. 241, L. 21.
At trial, Global did not present any evidence of the intent of the parties. Tr. Vol.
II, pp. 258-9, L. 12-3. At trial, Sherman presented evidence of the parties' intent that
was consistent with the terms of the Agreement. Exhibit 49 pp. 49-55. At trial Sherman
presented a variety of exhibits that prove Sprint and Global were both on actual notice
of the encroachment from 1996 to 2008, and the detailed efforts to keep the landowner
unaware of the encroachment. Please see Sherman's Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, R. pp. 1236-1247; Exhibits 1, 2 p. 756, 3, 5, 6 p. 89, 9 p. 4, 13 p.
650, 14 p. 6, 17 and 19 p.2; and Sherman's Trial Brief, R. pp. 1028-1030. The evidence
was largely unrebutted. In 1996 Sprint obtained but did not share with the landowner
any engineering document, title report commitment, as-built drawings, site survey, or
record of survey.

Exhibit 49 pp. 100-106; Exhibit 50 pp. 26-27. Sherman presented

evidence that in. 1996, Sprint had actual knowledge that The Wallace Family Trust
holdings including abandoned 24 th Street, and this knowledge came from Sprint's own
commitment for title insurance and the Agreement. The commitment clearly showed the
landowner's three different parcels, including 24th Street. Exhibit 2 p. 756.
In 1998, Sprint obtained another title insurance commitment for the leasehold
site that confirmed Sprint's actual knowledge that 24th Street had been vacated by the
city, and that abandoned 24 th Street should be included in the legal description of the
lease. Exhibit 6 p. 89. Neither the 1996 or 1998 commitment resulted in the purchase of
title insurance. In 2000, Sprint entered into an agreement with Ubiquitel, and provided a
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legal description to Ubiquitel that clearly included 24 th Street.

Exhibit 9 p. 4. In 2001,

Sprint entered into a co-locator agreement with Cricket. The purpose of subleases and
co-locater contracts are to rent space on the tower to other cell phone companies. The
Cricket agreement required land-owner consent, and Sprint used the correct legal
description (only Lot 4). Exhibit 18 p. 841. The description was inconsistent with the
title commitment prepared especially for Cricket at that time.

Exhibit 14 p. 6.

That

correct legal description was never used again by Sprint or Global in a recorded
document.
Later in 2001, Sprint contracted with Verizon for co-location.

The legal

description in the document was blank. Exhibit 10 p. 1162. In the same year, Sprint
prepared a landowner amendment to the Agreement related to the recent co-locator
contracts.

Exhibit 12.

The landowner amendment failed to include any legal

description. Sprint did not record this amendment despite that its normal practice was
to record at the County Recorder's Office any amendments to the Agreement. Exhibit
48 pp. 65-66. Th~ decision not to record the Agreement was made by Global's in-house
legal counsel at that time.

Exhibit 48 pp. 65-66. Later in that same year, Sprint

amended the Agreement with the landowner for a second time. Sprint again failed to
place the landowner on notice of the encroachment. Exhibit 16. In these two landowner
documents, Sprint did not use the legal description simultaneously provided to Ubiquitel,
Cricket, and Verizon, and confirmed by multiple title commitments.
In 2005, Sprint and The Wallace Family Trust signed an Agreement Regarding
Ground Lease.

The document was prepared by Global.

Global and Sprint are

interchangeable for all purposes. Exhibit 34, pp. 3-5; Exhibit 48, pp. 67-69; Tr. Vol. II,
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p. 269.

As successor in interest to Sprint, this was Global's first document with The

Wallace Family Trust. Global failed to provide a specific legal description, but instead
attached the entire PCS Site Agreement and all its Exhibits. Exhibit 20 pp. 191-209.
Next, Global prepared the "Site Designation Supplement to Master Lease". The Site
Designation was a management agreement between Sprint and Global. Exhibit 21 p.
113.

It specifically acknowledges that Global had notice of the PCS Site Agreement.

Exhibit 21 p. 119. It was Global's first opportunity to notify the public of the correct legal
description of the PCS Site Agreement.

However, Global researched, prepared and

created a lengthy and detailed legal description. Exhibit 21, p. 120. Global and Sprint
simultaneously co-authored

the

previous landowner Agreement and this Site

Designation, but with different legal descriptions. Compare Exhibit 20 p. 191 and Exhibit
21 p. 120.

This new legal description by Global had never been seen in any

Agreement, survey, title insurance commitment, or any other

internal document

concerning this site.
The Site Designation alleges that the legal description of the Agreement is as
follows: "A Leasehold Estate, said lease area being a portion of the following described
parent parcel:
Parcel No. 54-R:
A parcel of land being Lot 4, Block 22, Glenmore Addition to Coeur
d'Al~ne, according to the plat recorded in the office of the County
Recorder in Book B of Plats at Page 123, records of Kootenai
County, Idaho excepting therefrom that portion lying with in the right
of way boundaries of Interstate Highway 90 as described in that
certain Second Judgment and Decree of Condemnation No.
F17866 dated September 5, 1958, recorded June 16, 1060 in Book
226 at page 304 records of said Kootenai County.
Parcel No .. 57-R:
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A parcel of land being Lot 3, Block 22, Glenmore Addition to Coeur
d'Alene, according to the Plat recorded to the office of the County
Recorded in Book B of Plats at page 123 records of Kootenai
County, Idaho excepting therefrom that portion lying within the right
of way boundaries of Interstate Highway 90 as described in that
certain Second Judgment and Decree of Condemnation No. 17866
dated September 5, 1958 recorded June 16, 1960 in Book 26 at
page 304 records of said Kootenai County."
Global's new lengthy legal description required title research back to the 1958
Decree of Condemnation for US90, yet without any reference to abandoned 24 th Street.
Exhibit 21 p. 120.'
On July 25, 2005, Global recorded a "Leasehold Deed of Trust". Global needed
the Deed of Trust to obtain financing of 850 million dollars through Morgan Stanley.
Exhibit 23 p. 148. Global provided the newly created legal description to its lender.
Exhibit 23 p. 152.
On October 17, 2005, Global recorded the "Affidavit of Facts Relating to Title".
Exhibit 24.

The stated purpose of the Affidavit was to "clarify the record chain of

leasehold ownership". Exhibit 24 p. 95. Curiously, there is no stated reason why the
chain of title needed clarification in 2005. The new legal description was used. Exhibit
24 p. 103.

On May 23, 2006, Global recorded an "Assignment Agreement". Exhibit

26. Again, Global used the same fictitious legal description. Exhibit 26 p. 165. Global
used the legal description that varied from the PCS Site Agreement for these four recent
publicly recorded documents. All of these recordings occurred after Global and Sprint
had actual knowledge of the encroachment according to their own internal records, site
survey, record of survey, co-locator contracts, and title insurance commitments. See
Exhibits 1, 2 p. 756, 3, 5, 6 p. 89, 9 p. 4, 13 p. 650, 14 p. 6, 17, and 19 p. 2.
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In 2005, the first and only actual policy of title insurance was purchased on the
lease site by Sprint, Global or any co-locators.

Exhibit 22. The title policy only insured

the legal descript,ion recently created by Global. Exhibit 22 p. 65. Therefore, Global's
four recent recordings would be insured, and any title search on 24th Street would not
reveal Global's four recorded documents.
Chronologically, the very next document was prepared by Sprint, despite
Global's recent management contract.

It was Exhibit A to the SLA, where the legal

description now reverts back to Lot 4 and a portion of vacated 24th Street. The
document was not presented to the landowner.

This document was, of course,

unrecorded. Exhibit 27 p. 918.
Sherman 13laced Global on notice of the encroachment no later than November
of 2008. Tr. Vol. I, pp. 77-81; Exhibit 30 a-j. Upon discovering the encroachment in
2008, Sherman paid for a survey and a commitment for title insurance. Sherman shared
both with Global. Global now had actual proof of the encroachment. Exhibit 29 and 39.
After receiving notice of the encroachment from Sherman, Global ordered its own report
of title insurance. Exhibits 30a and 28. Curiously, Global restricted the scope of the title
insurance, starting from 7/25/2005 and ending on 11/10/2008. The dates coincide with
the use of the newly created legal description. Exhibit 28 p. 487, and 30c.

Usually,

Global does not fimit the scope of title insurance policies. Exhibit 48 p. 41. Of course,
this title report did not show the encroachment.

With full knowledge of the

encroachment and Sherman's allegations, from November 2008 to March of 2009,
Global sought to modify and expand the PCS Site Agreement with The Wallace Family
Trust. Exhibit 31, 32; Exhibit H-21. The cover letter was copied to seven people (five
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blind copies) within Global. Exhibit 32 pp. 287-288. In the proposed modification and
expansion of the lease site, Global sought indemnification from the landowner for
Global's own encroachment even though at that time the landowner was unaware of the
facts surrounding the encroachment. Exhibit 31 p. 235. Later, Global's representative
denied sending the proposed Amendment to The Wallace Family Trust, and also denied
authoring the letter containing his signature. Only at trial did he testify that in fact inhouse legal counsel authored them and he merely mailed them. Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 306, L. 625; Exhibit 31 and 32. When the proposed amended lease seemed unlikely, Global
took a default against The Wallace Family Trust on their complaint for indemnification.
They now possessed a court order indemnifying Global and holding the landowner
liable for its encroachment.

R. pp. 982-93; Exhibit 45.

Shortly thereafter, Global

executed a Stipulation with The Wallace Family Trust which assigned to Global a cause
of action to quiet title to the vacated 24 th Street. R. p. 333.

The basis for the

Assignment was the promise that they "would set aside the default Global has taken".
Exhibit 50 p. 63-6,5, Deposition Exhibit 45(a).
On the eve of the Summary Judgment hearings, Global tried to unilaterally
modify the legal description of the lease to align with the PCS Site Agreement. Exhibit
34 p. 1. A representative of Global had authority to sign for Global and Sprint. Global
and Sprint are interchangeable for all purposes. Exhibit 34, pp. 3-5; Exhibit 48, pp. 6769; Tr. Vol. 11, p. 269. Global's representative signed without actual knowledge of the
legal description on advice of in-house legal counsel. Exhibit 48 pp. 68-69. In Global's
attempt to change the legal description of the lease during the litigation, it now
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accurately (and for the first time publicly) uses a portion of vacated 24th Street. Exhibit
34 p. 6.
The trial court ruled as a matter of law, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(d), that the plain
language of the PCS Site Agreement is unambiguous as to the location of the lease
site. The lease site is to be east of and adjacent to the abandoned 24th Street right of
way. R. pp. 812-14. Any portion of the lease site located upon the east half of the
abandoned 24th Street exceeds the scope of the Agreement. R. pp. 813-14. The trial
commenced with the stipulation to admit the voluminous exhibits of both parties. The
primary trial testimony was from Sherman's managing member, Sprint's original
surveyor in 1996, Global's current expert witness, and Global's representative.
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II.
1.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Did Global Sufficiently Deceive The Landowner To Have Unclean Hands and
be Denied any Defense in Equity?

2.

Were the Trial Court's Erroneous Findings Accepted and Relied Upon in
Several Conclusions of Law?

3.

Is this Encroachment a Material Breach of the PCS Site Agreement?

4.

Was the Expansion of the Cell Tower Site a Result of Both Parties' Actions
and Written Agreements?

5.

Does the Doctrine of Boundary by Agreement Apply to Lease Agreements?

6.

Did Global Establish By Clear and Convincing Evidence that Each Element of
the Doctrine of Boundary by Agreement Applied to this Lease Agreement?

7.

Should Sherman be Awarded its Attorney's Fees and Costs?
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Ill.
A.

ARGUMENT

Standard Of Review
This Court on appeal will set aside a trial court's findings of fact if they are clearly

erroneous. Griffin v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 376 (2007); I.R.C.P. 52(a); Neider v. Shaw,
138 Idaho, 503, 506 (2003).

In deciding whether findings are clearly erroneous, this

Court determines whether the findings are supported by substantial, competent
evidence. Id., citing In re Williamson v. City of McCall, 135 Idaho 452, 454 (2001).
Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely on it. Id.
Findings based on substantial, competent evidence, although conflicting, will not be
disturbed on appeal. Id., citing Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 794 (2002).

A trial

court's findings of fact in a court-tried case will be liberally construed on appeal in favor
of the judgment entered, in view of the trial court's role as trier of fact.

Johnson v.

Newport, 131 Idaho 521, 523 ( 1998). However, over questions of law, appellate courts
exercise free review. Neider, 138 Idaho at 506;

Griffin v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 376

(2007).

8.

Global Sufficiently Deceived The Landowner To Have Unclean Hands and

Should be Denied any Defense in Equity.
Sherman's successful summary judgment established that Global had breached
the parties' agreement.

The law of the case was settled, and at trial only Global's

equitable defenses remained.

Because of the conduct of Global and the protracted

litigation, Sherman sought in its amended complaint to completely terminate the
contract.

The trial court largely accepted the equitable defenses offered by Global.

Sherman argues that Global has unclean hands sufficient that it should be denied any
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relief in equity. For Sherman's complete recitation of the relevant facts and analysis of
Global's inequitable conduct, see R. pp. 1227-1253.
The trial court's application of the equitable doctrines of equitable estoppel,
laches and unclean hands is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. The
denial of doctrines by the trial court will be upheld in the absence of an abuse of
discretion. To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion, the court
considers whether it correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it acted
within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards,
and whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Lamar Corp. v. City of
Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 40 (1999); Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 249 (Idaho 2004).
The doctrine of "unclean hands" is based on the maxim that, "he who comes into
equity must come with clean hands." Gilbert v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 104 Idaho
137 (1983); Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 249 (Idaho 2004). It allows a court to deny
equitable relief to a litigant on the ground that its conduct has been "inequitable, unfair
and dishonest, or fraudulent and deceitful as to the controversy at issue." Gilbert, supra;
see also Hoopes v. Hoopes, 124 Idaho 518 (Ct.App.1993).

In determining if this

doctrine applies, a court evaluates the relative conduct of both parties and determines
whether the conduct of the party seeking an equitable remedy should, in the light of all
the circumstance~, preclude such relief. Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378 (Ct.App.1997);
Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 249 (2004). The clean hands doctrine "stands for the
proposition that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his
conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent and deceitful as to the
controversy in issue." Ada Cnty. Highway Dist. v. Total Success /nvs., LLC, 145 Idaho
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360, 370 (2008) (quoting Gilbert v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 104 Idaho 137 (1983));

McVicars v. Christensen, No. 38705, Supreme Court of Idaho, February 20, 2014,
Opinion No. 22 (2014).
The analysis of unclean hands in this case looks first to the parties and then to
their actions. The previous landowner owned and operated a mom-and-pop bowling
alley near the location. After its sale the landowner rarely, if ever, visited the site. The
landowner was certainly less sophisticated than Sprint.
attorney of record and was mostly unrepresented.

It struggled in keeping an

It became subject to an order of

default. Although The Wallace Family Trust struggled to keep up in the litigation, there
is no evidence of any inequitable, unfair, dishonest, or deceptive behavior on its part.
Sherman bought a storage unit business, coffee stand, and car wash.

It has

been forthright with information from the beginning seeking merely an ejectment as the
owner of 24th Street. Based on the inequities between The Wallace Family Trust and
Global and the need to secure its own future, Sherman purchased Lot 4 from The
Wallace Family Trust. Ultimately, because of the actions of Global, as the owner of Lot
4, Sherman chose not to do business with Global and sought to terminate the
Agreement. Tr. Vol. I, p. 117, L. 12-16. In the alternative, it also proceeded with the
ejectment claim as the owner of 24th Street.
The cond':Jct and unclean hands of Sprint and Global directly involves this
encroachment, and they should be denied any remedy in equity. Sprint and Global are
large corporations with thousands of cell tower sites, many employees, and numerous
in-house counsel. Exhibit 48 pp. 6-10, p. 35, p. 66, L. 9-21, p.68, L. 25. Sherman has
exhaustively and, without exception showed Global's duplicitous conduct with publicly
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recorded documents.

Each and every publically recorded document or landowner

document by Global fails to mention 24th Street or even that which attaches to Lot 4 by
operation of law. However, each and every other document sets forth a correct legal
description including mention of 24th Street. R. pp. 1227-1253. The difference in legal
descriptions prepared by Sprint and Global is not a series of coincidence.
To summarize the inequitable, unfair, and dishonest conduct of Global, it is most
important to start with the fact that from 1996 Sprint was fully aware of the
encroachment. All of their internal documents reveal the encroachment, and they didn't
hide it from Ubiquitel, Cricket, and Verizon. Global is not an unsophisticated company.
They were not victims of the encroachment.

Exhibit 30b.

When Global took over

management of this company, they painstakingly created a new legal description. The
artful creation enabled them to record a new management agreement and deed of trust
worth hundreds of millions of dollars. The new legal description still satisfied its two
main purposes: not encumbering 24th Street and not placing the landowner on notice.
From 2008 Global treated Sherman the same way. They ignored the simple fact
of the encroachment, and produced restricted title commitments, threatening letters,
and stalled in order to renegotiate with the landowner. Exhibits 28, 30h, 31, and 32. In
its negotiations with the landowner, it could not get a written amendment to the
agreement. Exhibit 31. Therefore, it sued the landowner for indemnification. Using the
default judgment as leverage, Global sought to litigate its way to the ownership of 24th
Street by obtaining a stipulation from the landowner (a party opponent) that was in a
poor bargaining position (already in default). R. p. 333. At that time it already had an
order of indemnification for the quiet title action.
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Global sought to quiet title to 24th

Street in the landowner and be indemnified at the same time. Then Global could seek
execution of the order for indemnification on the landowner's only assets: Lot 4 and 24th
Street.

Therefore, Global was litigating for the ultimate fee simple in the property

underneath its cell tower. Global broke its promises to The Wallace Family Trust, and
continue to hold the order of indemnification against it.
Global's behavior can be portrayed as nothing but inequitable, unfair, dishonest,
fraudulent, and deceitful as to the controversy at issue. Sherman made the decision to
dissolve its business relationship with Global. In this case the trial court failed to even
acknowledge Sherman's allegations about Global's deceptive behavior. Tr. Vol. I, p. 30,

I. 18-20. The trial court failed to correctly perceive the application of unclean hands in
relation to Global's equitable defenses as a discretionary issue, and failed to reach its
decisions by the exercise of reason.
C.

The District Court's Finding of Fact No. 1 was Clearly Erroneous and was Relied

Upon in the Remainder of its Decision.
The record and trial testimony is replete with evidence that the cell tower
configuration has· changed over the years. While it is true that the monopole has not
moved since 1996, Sprint moved gates, fencing, and access, and the cell tower
improvements are not in the same place as when constructed in 1996. Exhibits 11 p.
141, 17, 49 pp. 94-95, and 50 p. 142; Tr. Vol. 11, pp. 190-191, L. 22-25; Exhibit E-12.
The trial court confused the location of the monopole with the fence and buildings. The
trial court's finding of fact number 1 states that "[t]he location of the Cell Tower Site has
not changed since originally built, though fencing and access has changed, resulting in
a 40' x 40' enclosure". Tr. p. 1335.
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Sprint's original lease site was fenced 35' x 35' according to the as-built drawings
of the site in 1996. Tr. Vol. II, p. 208, L. 4-10; Exhibit 3 p. 824; Tr. Vol. I, p. 63, L. 3; Tr.
Vol. II, pp. 162-3, L. 18-15.

Global's own expert trial witness noted the site was

originally designed and built as a 35 x 35' fenced area. Tr. Vol. II, p. 190, L. 24-25;
Exhibit E - 12. The original fence was not built adjacent to the curb of the abandoned
24th Street, and was not an encroachment. Exhibit 49 p. 111; Exhibit 50 p. 23-24; Tr.
Vol. Ill, pp. 297-8, L. 25-2; Tr. Vol. II, p. 208, L. 8-9. Global's representative admitted
that the lease site has changed. Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 297-8, L. 25-2. In approximately 2001,
the lease site changed from a 35' x 35' fenced enclosure to a 40' x 40' fenced
enclosure. Exhibit 11 pp. 141, 143, 148; Tr. Vol. I, p. 89, L. 22-24, and p. 94, L 20.
Sprint did not seek the landowner's consent or permission to change the fence. Verizon
was also involved in removing fencing, constructing a building, and expanding the site in
a westerly direction. Exhibit 11 p. 141 and 148; Tr. Vol. II, p. 198, L. 18-24. Exhibit A-4.
There was little if any testimony or documentary evidence as to when the site was finally
reconfigured in its current trapezoidal shape.
The trial court was clearly confused. It contradicted itself on this matter and the
decision is internally inconsistent. The trial court ignores its prior decision that the lease
site encompasses all of Lot 4, and repeatedly refers to the expansion of cell tower site.
Tr. pp. 1338, 1342, L. 12-18. This finding is clearly erroneous and inconsistent because
the trial court failed to make specific findings regarding the location of the original fence,
the reconfiguration of the fence, when this occurred, and by whom. It fails to grasp that
the fencing and building are the encroachment, not the monopole. This confusion
carried into the district court's conclusions on each defense.
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The trial court's finding that the location of the cell tower site "has not changed
since originally built" indicates that the court further erred in not finding that the
encroaching fence line occurred after the original construction. Exhibits 3 p. 824, 11 pp.
141, 143; Exhibits F-2, F-3, F-4. This erroneous finding leads to incorrect conclusions
of law, and this is shown in the first sentence of its analysis where the trial court states
that "the cell tower site in its current location in 1996". However, the court goes on to
contradict itself repeatedly by referencing that the parties agreed to the "expansion of
the cell tower site to an area of 40' x 40' over a period of 14 years." Tr. pp. 1338, 1342,

L. 12-18.
It is true there is competent evidence that the monopole itself has remained in
the same location since 1996. However, the ejectment claim is about the encroaching
fence, not the entire site or its center point. The testimony of the witnesses, exhibits,
and the court itself reference the fact that the fence has been relocated by Sprint and
Global and any other finding would be clearly erroneous.
C. 1. The Trial Court Failed to Recognize the Consequences of a
Change in Fencing.
The district court's contradictory statements (that the site is the same and that it
has changed over the years) are found throughout its analysis of each defense.
(1)

The landowner "allowed for expansion" of the site to 40' x 40'. Tr. pp.

1338, 1342, L. 17-18.
(2)

The subsequent written Agreements provide for the site in its "current

location". Tr. p. 1339.
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(3) The Wallace Family Trust and Global originally "built the Cell Tower Site on
that location". Tr. p. 1342.
(4) The Wallace Family Trust and Global "continually agreed and reaffirmed that
the Cell Tower Site was in the location that the parties anticipated that it would be
located". Tr. p. 1342.
(5)

The parties "clearly anticipated that the Cell Tower Site would be located

adiacent to the area in dispute." (emphasis added) R. p. 1340.

(6) The parties' actions and agreements which "subsequently fixed the boundary
of the Cell Tower Site. Tr. p. 1342.
If the record is clear regarding the change in the site, then the trial court erred in
not establishing those findings. If the case is about the location of a fence, the fact that
the fence changed is significant to each cause of action. No finding was made as to
how many fence changes occurred, why, when, or by whom.
contradictory ideas permeate the trial court's conclusions.

Unfortunately, these

Failing to make those

findings of fact is clearly erroneous, and lead to incorrect conclusions of law.

C. 2. The Trial Court's Erroneous Findings were Accepted and Relied Upon in
Several Conclusions of Law.
a.

Substantial Performance.

In its analysis, the trial court held that the landowner's "expansion of the Cell
Tower Site to an area of 40' x 40' over a period of 14 years" somehow "renders
substantial performance" of the Agreement and leads to the conclusion that Global's
breach was immaterial. R. p. 1338.
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b.

Remedy.

The trial court also held that the subsequent signed Agreements between the
landowner and Global "remedied" the breach. However, the alleged "remedy" was an
agreement to provide for the site "to be located in its current location". R. p. 1339, L. 1012. In Idaho law, forfeitures are remedied Scana, Inc. v. Greenwillow Trust, 133 Idaho
263, 287 (1999), defects are remedied, Harvey v. Alturas Goldmining Co., 2 Idaho 510,
523 (1893), and contractual defaults are remedied.

Wilson v. Hambleton, 109 Idaho

198, 200, 204 (Ct.App. 1985). The definition of remedy is the "rights given to a party by
law or by contract which that party may exercise upon a default by the other contracting
party, or upon the commissions of a wrong by another party".
DICTIONARY, 6th Ed.

BLACKS LAW

The district court did not cite which specific part of the

Agreements remedied the encroachment.

The district court did not make specific

findings how the encroachment was remedied.
c.

Boundary by Agreement.

The court contradicted itself within this analysis by finding The Wallace Family
Trust and Global "continually agreed" that the Cell Tower Site was in the location the
parties anticipated, yet The Wallace Family Trust also allowed the site's expansion. R.
p. 1342, L. 12-13, 16-18 ..
d.

Laches.

In this equitable defense, expansion of the original fence by Global is an
important finding of fact because it places the landowner on notice of the encroachment.
The trial court failed to make a finding as to when the breach occurred and how the
landowner was made aware of the encroachment.
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See Appellant's Brief, Section K,

infra The court stated that the landowner failed to assert its rights to the encroached

area "even after Mary Jo Wallace was placed on notice when she viewed the cell tower
site as built". R. p. 1344, L. 15-17. The court failed to specify if the landowner was on
notice of the encroachment by the original construction, the first fence line, reconfigured
fence line, or final trapezoid. The trial court also failed to connect the landowner to the
fence or relocation of the fence in any way on any particular day or year. In other words
how was it placed on notice? All of the fencing issues were solely constructed by Sprint
without permission or knowledge of the landowner.
From the onset, the trial court's decision was flawed. Its first finding of fact was
clearly erroneous, and the trial court relied on that incorrect assumption in its
conclusions as if it were substantial and competent evidence.

Because that finding

permeated several analyses, its conclusions regarding boundary by agreement, laches,
immaterial breach, and remedy are incorrect.
D.

This Encroachment is a Material Breach of the PCS Site Agreement.
The trial court stated that the cell tower site "as-built" does not defeat the

fundamental purpose of the Agreement. R. p. 1338. The law in Idaho is that a material
breach effects the "principal obligation" or defeats the object of the parties, despite
honest efforts to honor the agreement. State v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520, 523 (2008). In
this lease of real estate, the wrong land was used. Sherman insists that the land is the
fundamental purpose of a lease of land. The trial court's rationale was that substantial
performance was rendered in three ways: (1) the payment of rent; (2) the parties'
agreed expansion of the site; and (3) the parties "appeared to remedy the breach". R.
p. 1338.
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D. 1. Global's Payment of Rent Does Not Render the Breach Immaterial.
The trial court based its conclusion in part on Global's contractual payment of
rent, which it determined was substantial performance of the Agreement. The logical
conclusion is that the location of the cell tower site is incidental or subordinate to the
main purpose of the Agreement. R. pp. 1337-8. The court made great effort to note all
the rental payments to The Wallace Family Trust and Sherman. See district court
findings of fact numbers 10-13.

R. p. 1336. The court failed to realize that those

payments were contractually obligated for the use of Lot 4. Sprint and Global did not
pay any rent for the encroachment onto 24th Street. No part or percentage of the rental
payments went to the owner of 24th Street. No mathematical formula could partition the
rent received and use some of it to remedy a breach on another property.

The

encroachment onto 24th Street cannot be remedied by paying rent to the owner of Lot 4.
The trial court failed to distinguish the two parcels, and that they were owned by
separate persons at various times during this litigation.
D. 2. The Parties Did Not Agree to Expand the Site.
The court found the landowner received the benefit of the Agreement and
"allowed for expansion of the Cell Tower Site to an area of 40' x 40' over a period of
fourteen years". R. p. 1338. Upon this finding the court concludes the encroachment is
an immaterial breach. First of all, The Wallace Family Trust fully believed they sold 24th
Street in 2003 and stipulated to a Judgment in 2006. That is either seven or ten years,
not fourteen. Secondly, the last landowner written agreement concerning this site was
signed in 2005. That is nine years after the signing of the PCS Site Agreement. There
was no fourteen-year period.
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Most importantly, Sherman respectfully states that an agreement to "expand the
site" could only occur if the PCS Site Agreement was amended in writing and signed by
both parties. Exhibit 4 p. 1, paragraph 15(d).

No evidence exists that the 1996

Agreement was amended with regard to the legal description of the lease site. The
legal description of the PCS Site Agreement has never changed.

If the landowner

"allowed" or gave such permission to expand the scope of the Agreement to account for
the encroachment, then a new amended Agreement would exist.

The distinction

between material and immaterial would be irrelevant.
D. 3.

Global Did Not Remedy the Breach.

Finally, the trial court found that three of the parties' subsequent written
agreements, as prepared by Global, appeared to remedy the encroachment:
"the parties' agreements in January 25, 2002, May 10, 2005, and
November 13, 2008, appear to remedy the breach by providing for
the Cell Tower Site to be located in its current location." R. p. 1339.
Initially, this conclusion begs the question:

How does one remedy an

encroachment outside the terms of a written legal description? The district court
provided no analysis on this point. In order to remedy a breach the parties must at least
address the problem (the encroachment) in a written document that amends the legal
description as found in the Agreement (to include 24th Street), which is signed by both
parties and publicly recorded. However, the three documents cited are silent as to the
encroachment, and do not even attempt to amend the legal description.
Appellant's Brief, Section G.2 c, d and e, infra.
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See

E.

Sherman's Status as Successor in Interest Does Not Render the Breach

Immaterial.
In support of its decision that the breach was immaterial, the district court stated
"Sherman knew of the breach and the remedial measures taken by SSLP [Sprint] and
Global since 1996.

Sherman cannot now claim that the immaterial breach was not

remedied at the time it took title to the property". R. p. 1339.
It is true, during the litigation Sherman became aware of the encroachment and
all the documents concerning this lease. It is also true that it came into contractual
privity with Global in 2010 by the purchase of Lot 4.

It is unclear how this knowledge

would render a previous breach immaterial. Sherman was well aware in the purchase
of Lot 4 that it was buying the good and the bad. The sale of Lot 4 does not wash the
breach clean. Sherman steps into the shoes of its predecessor in interest in all ways.
Sherman, as owner of 24th Street, is still entitled to eject Global.

As successor in

interest in Lot 4, Sherman inherits all the rights and duties as the landlord of the
Agreement. Ow~ership of Lot 4 and the knowledge of the Agreement and subsequent
documents cannot render the breach (encroachment on 24th Street) immaterial.
F.

The Encroachment Was a Material Breach of the PCS Site Agreement.
In this lease of land, the wrong land was used. As a result, the encroachment is a

restriction on the .private property rights of the owner of 24th Street. The fact that both
parcels were at times owned by one landowner seems to have confused the trial court.
Admittedly, that fact might, in some circumstances, render a breach immaterial because
when an encroachment only concerns the original landowner's property, the neighbor's
interests are not part of the analysis.
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However, when Sherman commenced this

litigation, it owned only 24 th Street and had no contractual privity with Global.

The

ejectment claim was a simple request to "remove yourself from my property". It does
not mean "move onto my other property".

This point may be further highlighted by

understanding that Sherman has other plans for 24th Street. Lot 4 is fully encumbered
by the PCS Site Agreement. Its purpose is solely for the cell tower, and is not used in
any other manner. However, 24th Street is part of the self storage group of businesses
and has value unrelated to the cell tower. Its future development as part of the city's
entry corridor is based upon floor area ratio and frontage on Sherman Avenue. In other
words, each square foot matters. Sherman has the right to relocate Global's access
easement to free 24th Street entirely. Exhibit 4 p. 184 (PCS Site Agreement, Ex. d.). A
relocated access easement directly from Sherman Avenue onto Lot 4 would
unencumber24th Streetexceptfortheencroachment. Tr. Vol. II, pp.160-161. Because
the owner of Lot 4 and 24th Street became the same person during this litigation there
has been confusion. The original parties contracted to lease Lot 4, and it is a material
breach to use another's property.
Secondly, this breach must have been material, i.e., important, because when
Global became aware of the encroachment it made great efforts to keep that knowledge
from the landowner. R. pp. 1226-1259.
Finally, thi_s encroachment caused the entire litigation. The salient facts and
circumstances of the encroachment were hidden by Global and took years to uncover.
The encroachment stole the quiet enjoyment of the property for several years during
this litigation, and according to the trial court now it permanently stole the property.
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G.

The Expansion of the Cell Tower Site Was Not a Result of Both Parties' Actions

and Written Agreements.
The district court concluded that the parties engaged in a series of "actions and
agreements" in regards to the boundaries of the Cell Tower Cite. R. p. 1337.
G. 1. There Were No Actions of the Landowner that Changed the Boundaries of
the Site.
The trial court did not specify which landowner actions affected the boundaries of
the cell tower site.

The only action really mentioned was the receipt of rent. The

voluminous record and trial transcript is devoid of any evidence the landowner took any
action (that was not in writing) that had anything to do with the fence or boundaries of
the site. There is no evidence that they met at the site, joined in any repairs of the
fence, or cooperated in any survey or landscaping plans. In fact, there is little evidence
the landowner even visited the site after completion.
G. 2. There Were No Written Agreements That Changed the Boundaries of the
Site.
The trial court concluded that the parties expanded the site by written agreement.
R. p. 1336. The court did not make a specific finding of fact as to which agreement

expanded the site.

Therefore, Sherman will address each agreement listed in the

court's findings of fact, numbered 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. R. p. 1335. Sherman respectfully
asserts that each of the new findings are inconsistent with the court's previous
conclusions, unsupported by the record, and unsupported by the documents
themselves.
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a.

The April 23, 2001, Amendment to PCS Site Agreement: FOF #2.

This Amendment to PCS Site Agreement did not change the legal description of
the PCS Site Agreement.

Exhibit 12. The contract was merely to facilitate co-location,

and did not contain any reference to a legal description or the boundaries of the cell
tower site.
b.

The Sept. 19, 2001, Amendment to PCS Site Agreement: FOF #3.

This Amendment was also for co-location purposes.

Exhibit 16.

This

Amendment incorporated in full the PCS Site Agreement and its legal description. This
Amendment did not refer to any other legal description, drawing, or boundary of the cell
tower site. The Amendment did not change the boundaries of the site.
c.

The January 25, 2002, Memorandum Agreement: FOF #4.

The 2002 Memorandum Agreement had as its primary function to relocate the
access easement and reconfigure the site and its gates. That purpose is stated in the
body of the document and in several places in the exhibits. Exhibit A-4. The
Memorandum Agreement does not purport to amend the legal description of the site. In
fact, the Memorandum Agreement specifically states that "in the event of any
inconsistency between this Memorandum and the Agreement (meaning PCS Site
Agreement) the Agreement shall control." Exhibit A-4 p. 1, paragraph 6.
The trial court's findings regarding this Memorandum Agreement are inconsistent
with its earlier findings and decision pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(d).

Specifically, the trial

court has now made a finding that the exhibits "show the cell tower site located on the
eastern portion of the formerly 24th Street".

R. p. 1335. This is shockingly inconsistent

considering all tlie prior litigation, the Decision on Summary Judgment, R. p. 792,
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Memorandum Decision on Motion to Reconsider, R. pp. 1213-14, and the plain
language and drawings of the Memorandum Agreement itself. Exhibit A-4.
The Mem0randum Agreement makes two attempts to describe the site in a
manner very consistent with the PC Site Agreement.

It contains a written legal

description in Exhibit "A" and a drawing in Exhibit "B". The legal description contained in
Exhibit "A" merely states it is a parcel of land being Lot 4.

This legal description is

exactly the same· as set forth in the PCS Site Agreement Exhibit "A". Exhibit "B" is a
CAD drawing very similar to Exhibit "B" in the PCS Site Agreement. The purpose of the
drawing is to show the location of the new access easement. The drawing shows the
lease area and abandoned 24 th Street clearly separate from each other. Exhibit A-4 p.
2. This drawing, for all relevant purposes here, has the same legal effect as Exhibit "B"
of the PCS Site Agreement.

Secondly, the trial court now finds that the 2002

Memorandum Agreement "identifies the cell tower site as being located on a tax parcel
number that applies to both Lot 4, Block 22, and the eastern half of the formerly 24th
Street". R. p. 1335. The incidental inclusion in small font of an assessor's tax parcel
number at the bottom of page 3 is hardly conclusive evidence of an intent to amend the
PCS Site Agreement. Exhibit A-4 p.3. The Memorandum does not actually mention
24th Street in any way, just the Assessor's parcel number.

The number must be

researched in the volumes of the County Assessors office to see that at one time the tax
parcel number for the east half of 24th Street and Lot 4 were combined for tax purposes.
In other words, at one point they were owned by the same tax payer. If this is relevant
at all, it

may be construed as a mere inconsistency, in which case the PCS Site

Agreement would control pursuant to the Memorandum Agreement. Exhibit A-4 p. 1,
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paragraph 6.
Although previously litigated to conclusion, it still seems necessary to confirm the
district court's previous ruling to the district court itself.

The effect of the legal

description was fully litigated and reconsidered to a final conclusion pursuant to I.R.C.P.
56(d). Global has previously and unsuccessfully argued that the 2002 Memorandum
Agreement amended the legal description set forth in the PCS Site Agreement, yet the
trial court repeatedly disagreed. R. pp. 1212-1214.

The trial court's prior finding

pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(d) states:
"The plain language of the Memorandum of PCS Site Agreement,
recorded July 9, 1996 in Instrument No. 143059, is unambiguous.
That is, the plain language of the agreement indicates the lease site
is to the east of and adjacent to the abandoned 24th Street right of
way.
Accordingly the court concludes that as a matter of law and for
purposes of summary judgment that any portion of the lease site
located upon the east half of the abandoned 24th Street right of way
exceeds the scope of the PCS Site Agreement. Therefore, for the
purposes of this litigation and pursuant to Rule 59(d)[sic], there is
no c;lispute regarding the fact that Global's cell tower cite physically
encroaches on property not contemplated under the original lease."
R. pp. 812, 814.
There is no inconsistency between the PCS Site Agreement and the 2002
Memorandum Agreement. The purpose of the 2002 Memorandum Agreement was to
relocate an access easement, not to change the legal description of the PCS Site
Agreement.

d.

The May 10, 2005, Agreement Regarding Ground Lease: FOF #5.

This Agreement allowed Global to assign some of its contractual rights to others.
Exhibit 20.

The- landowner also signed the document.

There is an attached legal

description in this Agreement: the PCS Site Agreement itself. Therefore, this document
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could not change the legal description or the boundaries of the fence. The trial court
has intimated that this subsequent Agreement affirmed that "no breach or default
existed under the· PCS Site Agreement". R. p. 1335. This despite its previous ruling that
a breach occurred pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(d). R. p. 1337; R. pp. 800, 811-814.
However, in 2005, when Global took over the management of this site, no party knew of
the encroachment except Global. By signing this, The Wallace Family Trust is proving
they did not know of the encroachment.

Without full disclosures, the boiler plate

language would be ineffective to impute knowledge or give actual notice of the
encroachment to The Wallace Family Trust. This was an attempt by Global to deceive
the landowner.

e.

The November 17[sicl, 2008, Letter Agreement: FOF #6.

The November 12, 2008 letter sought an extension of the Agreement and a right
of first refusal. Exhibit H-21.

Interestingly, this letter was sent to the landowner

concurrently with Sherman's communications that placed Global on notice (undeniably)
of the encroachment. Tr. Vol. II, p. 281, L, 5-13.

Because of its awareness of the

encroachment and Sherman's allegations, Global inserted an indemnification clause in
the proposed Amendment. Exhibit 31, p. 235. This letter was Global's attempt to
memorialize the t_erms of a future agreement, or in essence it was written negotiations.
The extension was never consummated. Exhibit 31. Because the extension never
materialized, this letter cannot amend the terms of the PCS Site Agreement.

However,

the trial court now finds this letter amended the PCS Site Agreement by extending the
lease "at the present location of the cell tower site". R. p. 1335. Nowhere in the letter is
that language used or is the current location of the site confirmed.
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In fact, no

description of the site is ever mentioned. The letter only proposes that if a survey is
needed, Global will pay for it.

Exhibit H-21 p. 378. The letter was followed by the

proposed amendment. Exhibit 31. In that proposal, Global seeks a "continuing right to
relocate any or all of its equipment. .. to any other area of that parcel of land being Lot
4. . . and upon such relocation the site shall automatically expand to include such
additional area and such additional access drive, at no additional cost to lessee".
Exhibit 31 p. 235, paragraph 5 (emphasis added). The proposal contained no other
legal description. The trial court's finding that this letter concerns "the present location
of the cell tower site" is not found anywhere in the document. Global even understood
that and included its expansion language in the proposed amendment. The trial court
may have confused the letter agreement with the proposed amendment. However, the
proposed amendment was never executed. One final point regarding this letter is that
in 2008 The Wallace Family Trust did not believe it still owned 24th Street. It signed a
stipulation to the entry of the 2006 Judgment. Therefore, it would not have purposely
contracted to encumber 24 th Street.
H.

The Doctrine of Boundary by Agreement Does Not Apply to Lease Agreements.
The trial court acknowledged that the doctrine of boundary by agreement has

only been applied in Idaho to adjacent landowners and never to a long term lease. R. p.
1341. The district court still applied the doctrine to this case because this "dispute
regards a fenced real estate boundary that has stood, and will stand, for a significant
period of time." R. p. 1342. The trial court made no other analysis.
The application of the doctrine to this case is a question of law and of first
impression to the appellate courts of Idaho.
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This Court may freely review this

conclusion and draw its own conclusions from the facts presented in the record. Sim v.

Daker, 154 Idaho 975, 976 (2013); Watkins Co, LLC v. Storms, 152 Idaho, 531, 535
(2012).
The district court cited Flying Elk Investment, LLC v. Cornwall, 149 Idaho 9
(2010) for the two elements of the doctrine of boundary by agreement: (1) there must be
an uncertain or disputed boundary, and (2) a subsequent agreement fixing the
boundary. Id.; R. p. 1340.
The Flying Elk case was a dispute over a sliver of land between neighboring
landowners. A fence had existed for roughly 70 years, and had been built, moved,
rebuilt, repaired, and relocated since the 1940s. Id. at 12.

Because of those long-

standing actions in full view of the parties over many decades, the court implied an
agreement from the parties' conduct. However, the court stated that mere acquiescence
alone would not have been enough to establish a boundary by agreement. Id. at 13.
The district court also cited the case Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264 (2005)
which also involved coterminous landowners. There were fences that had existed in the
same location for 40 years, yet neither party knew who built the fences or why. Id. at
268-9. The roadways on this property were the exclusive way to access the appellant's
property. The respondents removed a portion of the fence and removed the cattle
feeder near the fence. Id. at 269. In addition to the prima facie case, the Luce court
analyzed two presumptions that may apply to a long-established fence. First, when
fence line has been erected, and "then coterminous landowners have treated the fence
line as fixing the boundary between their properties for such a length of time that neither
ought to be allowed to deny the correctness of its location", the law presumes an
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agreement fixing that fence line as the boundary. Id. at 271. Second, coupled with the
long existence and recognition of a fence as a boundary, the lack of any evidence as to
the manner of its original location, the law will presume that it is originally located as a
boundary by agreement if any uncertainty or dispute exists. Id. at 271-2.
The Luce case chose not to apply the doctrine of boundary by agreement. The
doctrine is "based on a reasonable assumption implied from the surrounding
circumstances". Id. at 272; see also Griffel v. Reynolds, 136 Idaho 397, 400 (2001).
The Luce court's analysis focused on the fact that the irregular shape of the property
would make the assumption of an implied agreement unreasonable and that the party
failed to present any evidence that the fence settled an actual disagreement or
uncertainty. Luce. at 272.
In the case of Griffen v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 376 (2007), a landowner built a
fence with the dual purpose of delineating the edge of their property and containing their
livestock. Id. at 377. The fence was built in 1977, and the true boundary of the property
was only described by a 1995 survey. Id. Despite the discovery, no objection was made
to the fence until 2001, and litigation commenced only in 2004. Id. The Griffen court
analyzed the doctrine of boundary by agreement, and although the case had a long
standing fence, the court concluded that a period of long acquiescence by one party is
not sufficient to overcome clear evidence of a lack of agreement. Id. at 378; see also
Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 492, 495 (2002). In addition, that case did not have a lack of

evidence as to how the fence came to be located.

The court concluded that a

boundary by agreement could not have occurred when one of the parties intended
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for the fence to be used as a cattle barrier. Griffen at 378.

In other words, the fence

was not solely used to mark the boundary of the land. Id. at 379.
H. 1. These Parties are Not Coterminous or Adjoining Landowners.
In the case at hand, we do not have adjoining landowners as in the Flying Elk
line of cases. These are not two neighbors living in a rural setting. Global and Sprint
never visited the site after construction, doing its work through subcontractors. In 1996,
the landowners owned all the land surrounding Lot 4. Since the sale of land in 2003,
the landowner moved out of the state of Idaho.

The lease payments were passive

income from property otherwise devoid of importance. In the appellate cases cited,
supra, the parties were present and motivated to notice the fencing because they lived
nearby and actually used the fence.

In this case, there is no evidence that the

landowner ever visited the site, monitored its construction, improved the site, or was
aware of the fence's location or relocation. The relocation of the fences was done
unilaterally by Global. The landowner lacked any motivation to care about the fence.
H. 2. This Encroachment is Not a Long-Standing Fence.
Unlike Flying Elk, Luce, or Griffen, this is not a long-standing fence. The original
fence was built by Sprint in 1996.

The fence was changed 5 years later in

approximately 2001. The Wallace Family Trust transacted to sell 24th Street in 2003
which was seven years from original construction.

From then on they did not even

believe they owned 24th Street, and had no reason to monitor the fence.
H. 3. The Fence had Another Purpose Besides a Boundary.
In this case, the fence per se is not the boundary for the Agreement. Neither
party measured the fence to determine the lease. The PCS Site Agreement
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encompassed all of Lot 4. The Agreement is Lot 4. Exhibit 4 pp. 175, 178, 182. The
lease could occupy up to approximately 2,500 square feet of Lot 4 and be permissible.
Exhibit 4 p. 173, paragraph 1. Sprint's fencing or reconfiguration of the fencing within
Lot 4 would not violate the Agreement or even draw notice by the landowner. The
Agreement was not defined by the original fence, or the reconfigured fence.

The

purpose of the high chain link fence and razor wire was not to define the lease area or
provide a legal description. The various fencing was built to protect Sprint's investment
and provide public safety, not to mark the lease boundaries.

The reason the fence

changed was because Sprint's needs changed and its co-locators' needs changed. The
lease did not change. The lease boundaries did not change. Even if for argument's
sake the landowner was aware of changes in the fence, it would not ascribe importance
to the change in fencing because the PCS Site Agreement did not change.
H. 4. There was No Uncertainty or Dispute Regarding the Boundary.
For this doctrine to be applied to the facts of this case, there must also be some
uncertainty or dispute as to the boundary of the PCS Site Agreement. However, the
trial court has previously and repeatedly stated that the Lease Agreement was clear.
The trial court again stated in its final decision that "the PCS Site Agreement signed by
both parties clearly anticipated that the cell tower site would be located adjacent to the
area in dispute." R p. 1346. The trial court stated Sprint built the cell tower on the
wrong location.

No other uncertainty or dispute was cited.

A unilateral mistake in

construction is not mutual uncertainty or dispute as to the terms of the lease.
H. 5. The Parties did Not Make a Subsequent Agreement Regarding the Fence.
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The doctrine requires some form of subsequent agreement, and mere
acquiescence by-an absent landowner alone is not enough. The district court in this
matter did not cite one action of the landowner that actually concerned an agreement or
affirmation concerning the fence.

The Flying Elk line of cases involved decades of

farming, driving on or near the boundary, repairs, and an experiential knowledge of the
fence. In those cases, the fence mattered.
relevant action concerning the fence.

In this case, the trial court failed to find one
Even the subsequent written agreements

concerning the cell tower site, discussed supra, did not concern the fence.

Those

agreements affirmed the PCS Site Agreement, not the fencing.
H. 6. The· Luce Presumptions for Long-Term Fences Do Not Apply to this Lease
Agreement.
From the Luce case, the trial court relied upon two related presumptions that may
be implied from a long-standing fence. However, the two presumptions cited by the trial
court are also not applicable to the facts of this case. First, this is not a long-standing
fence between coterminous landowners.

This case does not have two parties treating

a fence as if it fixes the boundary between their two properties. Sprint built the fence for
its own purposes and changed the fence for its own purposes. Second, this case does
not have a lack of evidence as to the origin of the fence. The fence was built in 1996 by
Sprint.
H. 7. The Doctrine of Boundary by Agreement Does Not Apply to the Facts of
This Lease.
The rationale behind the doctrine does not apply to this case. These are not
neighboring landowners separated by a long-standing fence. The landowner owned all
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of the land under and surrounding the cell tower site and had no motivation in which to
dispute the initial' placement of the fences, or their reconfiguration. The fence was not
recognized as a boundary and its location did not matter to the landowner.
landowner only acquiesced in its location, but for a short time only.

The

The short-term

acquiescence did not have any attributes of an agreement between the parties. In fact,
Global negotiated several actual agreements with the landowner that failed to raise and
resolve any uncertainty. The facts of this case distinguish it from the appellate cases
cited supra. The doctrine of boundary by agreement and its presumptions do not apply
to this lease agreement.
I.

Global Failed to Establish By Clear and Convincing Evidence that Each Element

of the Doctrine of Boundary by Agreement Applied to this Lease Agreement.
If this Court on appeal concludes as a matter of law that the doctrine of boundary
by agreement may apply to the facts of this case, Global still has the burden of proof on
each element by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court's analysis of the first
element curtly stated that the landowner and cell tower company built the site on a
location not contemplated by the Agreement. R. 1342. No other evidence was cited to
show clear and convincing evidence that there was any uncertainty or dispute regarding
the boundary or terms of the lease by Sprint or landowner.

It is undisputed that the

boundary of the lease was clear, but that Sprint erred in building the fence or in rebuilding the fence. This does not create uncertainty or a dispute. The only dispute
arises when Sherman comes into ownership of 24th Street and requests to move the
fence onto Lot 4. The trial court states the "boundary and location of the Cell Tower
Site are now disputed by Sherman". R. p. 1342. (emphasis added) However, the court
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failed to apply the first element to the original landowner. The doctrine is inapplicable
directly to Sherman.
Regarding the second element of the doctrine, the district court stated that the
landowner and Global "continually agreed" that the cell tower was in the location that
the "parties anticipated". R. p. 1342. The trial court relied upon the landowner allegedly
entering

into subsequent written

agreements

regarding

the

boundary.

The

inapplicability of each of those written Agreements as to the boundary of the lease was
discussed, supra.

See Appellant's Brief, Section G.2, infra .. These documents do not

contain clear and convincing evidence that the landowner was made aware or
acknowledged the encroachment, disputed the encroachment or the boundary, and
agreed to fix the dispute by the recognition of the fence line as the new legal description
of the lease.
The trial 9ourt again references the normal rental payments as clear and
convincing evidence of an implied or express agreement. Merely accepting the normal
agreed-upon rental payments is not clear and convincing evidence concerning the
second element of the doctrine.
Finally, neither of the two presumptions regarding long-term fences (as set forth
in Luce) were established by clear and convincing evidence to the facts of this case. As
applied to this case, Global has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence
each element of the doctrine, and in fact they have been rebutted by contrary evidence.
Flying Elk at 14. ·Griffin v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 376 (Idaho 2007).
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J.

The District Court Failed to Find When the Doctrine of Boundary by Agreement

Applied to this Landowner.
Which fence line does the trial court conclude is the boundary by agreement?
The trial court only refers to two configurations: 35' x 35' and 40' x 40', but the current
site is in the shape of a trapezoid. R. p. 10. The fence configurations were not part of
any written document signed by the landowner that amended the PCS Site Agreement.
Did the boundary by agreement occur in 1996 or 2001? The court failed to make these
important findings
K.

Global Failed to Prove that its Encroachment was Known by The Wallace Family

Trust Prior to the Litigation.
In this case, the equitable defenses of boundary by agreement and laches
require prior knowledge or experience of the encroachment by the landowner. You
cannot have a dispute or uncertainty, and then agree to settle the dispute or uncertainty
unless the party is aware of the encroachment. Likewise, you cannot fail to assert your
rights without an awareness that your rights have been invaded.
The testimony of the trustee of The Wallace Family Trust was exhaustive. The
court's Decision states that The Wallace Family Trust knew of the encroachment, but
provides no citation for such knowledge other than seeing the cell tower as built, and
the written Agreements discussed supra. The reason the Decision lacks any citations is
that they do not exist. On this element, Global's duplicity failed them.

If they would

have recorded any subsequent agreement using 24th Street, it would have been record
notice to the landowner and the public. However, Global purposefully avoided recording
any document encumbering 24th Street. R. pp. 1226-1259, 1028-1030. Therefore, none
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of these documer)ts could place The Wallace Family Trust or any citizen on notice of the
encroachment. The Trustee repeatedly and emphatically denied any prior knowledge of
the encroachment and Global's great efforts to produce proof of prior knowledge failed.
The best proof of the landowner's ignorance of the encroachment is Kootenai County
Case CV 03-7690, the companion and consolidated case herein.
entirely about 24 th Street.

That case was

Had anyone known of the encroachment by Global,

everything would have changed in that case. In that litigation, the encroachment was
never referenced in any document, by any lawyer, or any party. That litigation lasted
three years, and ·ended in the Judgment of May 5, 2006. R. pp. 45-6.

The case had

three attorneys of record, discovery, motions, and a stipulated resolution.

The

landowner had every motive and opportunity to bring to light any encroachment at that
time, because it would have supported its main cause of action that it never intended to
sell all of 24th Street. Although the trial court decided its 2006 Judgment was ineffective,
it still serves as convincing proof that the landowner did not have prior knowledge of
Sprint's encroachment at that time. The repeated testimony of the landowner in this
case was undisputed. The trier of fact may not arbitrarily disregard the credible and
unimpeached testimony of a witness. Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 62728, (1979); Wood v. Hoglund, 131 Idaho 700, 703 (Idaho 1998). Similarly, it has long
been recognized that unless a witness's testimony is inherently improbable, or rendered
so by facts and circumstances disclosed at trial, the trier of fact must accept as true the
positive, uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness. Id.; Pierstorff v. Gray's Auto
Shop, et al., 58 Idaho 438, 447 (1937). In this case, the record discloses that none of

the testimony from the landowner was contradicted or disputed by Global. Likewise,
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missing from the .final decision is a finding by the trial court that the testimony was not
credible. Therefore, the district court's factual determination that the landowner knew of
the encroachment is unsupported by the record and is clearly contrary to the evidence
presented. Without proof of prior knowledge, the defenses of boundary by agreement
and laches fail.
L.

The Trial Court Erred in Assigning Notice to Sherman Itself.
Admittedly, if laches is proven against a predecessor in interest, Sherman may

be bound by such equitable claim. However, the trial court erred in assigning notice to
Sherman itself. The trial court assumed that Sherman's purchase of Lot 4 in 2010
placed Sherman on notice pursuant to a laches analysis. Sherman's purchase of Lot 4
only means it purchased the land subject to the lease, acquired contractual privity, and
was bound by the lease Agreement. In 2006, when Sherman purchased 24 th Street,
albeit with a cloud on title, it did not know of the encroachment or the prior written
agreements between the landowner and Global because the numerous recordings did
not reference 24 th Street. Sherman became aware of the encroachment only in 2008. It
immediately set out to fix the problem. Sherman never failed to assert its rights. The
trial court erred in applying the equitable defense of laches directly to Sherman.

M.

Sherman Should be Awarded its Attorney's Fees and Costs.
Sherman seeks an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to I.C. §

12-120(3) and the PCS Site Agreement on its termination of the Agreement based upon
a material breach.

In addition, it seeks to have the Memorandum Decision for

Attorney's Fees and Costs, and Judgment vacated. R. pp. 1439.

For Sherman's

analysis on the issues and basis for the attorney's fees claim, please see Sherman's
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"Memorandum in Support of Objection to Attorney's Fees and Costs"

R. pp. 1407-

1422.
Apart from the breach of contract claim, Sherman's position is that its remaining
cause of actions, ejectment and mesne profits, and Global's defenses were all in equity.
Therefore, neither party should be awarded its fees and costs on those claims. The
PCS Site Agreement would not be integral to the equitable claims or defenses as
presented. The remaining claims are concerning 24th Street only. Lot 4 and the PCS
Site Agreement are not the actual basis or gravamen of the equitable claim or defenses.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this case, Global's inequitable, unfair, dishonest, and deceitful conduct
exposes that it has unclean hands and it should be denied any defense in equity.

In

addition to its conduct, Global has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence
that any of the equitable doctrines relieve it of its breach. Many of the district court's
finding of facts were clearly erroneous and were accepted and relied upon in several
conclusions of law. The encroachment was already determined as a matter of law to be
a breach of the PCS Site Agreement, and it remains a material breach.

DATED this ?'hay of March, 2014.

ERi~~:-Attorney for Appellant
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